Hungary's Pronatalist Experiment
Hungary embarked on one of the world's most extensive pronatalist policy experiments under former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, aiming to reverse a declining birth rate. These policies included substantial financial incentives such as interest-free loans, tax breaks, and mortgage subsidies for young, married, heterosexual couples in the formal job market who committed to having children. For instance, couples like Barbara and Levi Elek took out significant loans, promising to have two children to qualify for these benefits.
The nation's fertility rate was significantly below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, a common issue across many European countries since the 1980s. Orbán's government, re-elected in 2010, explicitly rejected immigration as a solution to population decline, advocating instead for an increase in 'Hungarian children'.
Initial Success and Subsequent Decline
Initially, these policies appeared to yield positive results. Hungary's fertility rate rose from 1.25 in 2010 to 1.59 by 2020. This period led some, particularly US conservatives, to hail Hungary as a success story in population policy. However, this upward trend was short-lived. By 2025, the fertility rate had fallen back to 1.31, barely higher than when the incentives were first introduced.
Tomas Sobotka, a demographer from the Vienna Institute of Demography, described the outcome as a 'clear failure' when judged against the policies' original aims. Some argue that while the policies didn't reverse the trend, they might have prevented an even steeper decline. Fruzsina Skrabski of the pro-family NGO Three Princes, Three Princesses, believes these measures led to 'hundreds of thousands of fewer children' not being born.
Uneven Impact and Broader Factors
The benefits of these policies were not uniformly distributed. Professor János Tóth, a philosopher at Hungary's University of Szeged, suggests the incentives were most effective for the lower-middle class in rural areas, while their impact in cities, where fertility rates are lowest, was less significant. The value of financial aid, such as the 'baby-expecting loan,' has also been eroded by soaring inflation.
Eva Fodor, co-director of the Democracy Institute at the Central European University, posits that the initial rise in fertility might have been a temporary acceleration, prompting some couples to have children earlier than they would have otherwise, rather than encouraging more births overall. This pattern, she notes, is common with pronatalist policies.
"It seems that these policies were effective for a little while, like most pronatalist policies are," Fodor stated. "So the fertility rate went up for a while, for a year or two, and then it started falling again."
Furthermore, Hungary's fertility trends may also mirror broader regional patterns. The Czech Republic, for instance, experienced a similar boost and subsequent decline in fertility without implementing such extensive pronatalist measures.
Beyond Financial Incentives: The Role of Basic Services and Culture
Many parents suggest that the real barriers to having more children extend beyond financial considerations. Antonia Miskolczi, a mother in Budapest, highlighted concerns over the quality of Hungary's healthcare system as a more significant factor in her decision-making than any financial incentive. She advocates for improving fundamental services like education and healthcare to genuinely encourage larger families.
Research by Eva Fodor involving well-educated middle-class Hungarian women revealed that while government support was appreciated as a one-time payment, it did not replace the need for robust institutions, healthcare systems, and childcare, which many found insufficient.
Other countries, such as South Korea, have also invested massive sums in pronatalist policies, including generous 'baby bonuses' and child benefits, yet have seen their fertility rates continue to decline. Globally, factors like lockdowns, vaccination campaigns, and a general sense of instability have been cited by demographers like Tomas Sobotka as contributing to declining birth rates, as people's confidence in the future diminishes.
Cultural factors also play a significant role. Countries like Sweden, through policies promoting shared parental leave, affordable childcare, and universal pre-school, saw fertility rates rise in the 2000s by making it easier to combine work and family life. These 'Nordic policy packages' are believed to offer better protection against deep fertility declines. Conversely, critics argue that Hungary's policies have inadvertently reinforced traditional gender roles, emphasizing women as primary caretakers.
Israel stands out as the only OECD country with a fertility rate comfortably above replacement, despite not having exceptionally high government spending on family benefits. Its strong cultural and ideological focus on having children, partly influenced by historical factors, is seen as a key driver. However, experts caution that a government's ability to shift culture is inherently limited.
Source: What one country's experiment says about attempts to boost birth rates